Abstract. Today we are confronted with an enormous variety of formal software engineering approaches and tools. Among these are many that address the critical early stages of software development. However, only little attention has been paid to the integration of different specialised approaches and to the overall development process. In this paper we present a technique for formal requirements analysis (observer models) that deals with particular perspectives on a system rather than with particular aspects of it. A realistic gasburner example illustrates the overall approach.
Introduction
Thirty years ago (in the early seventies of the last century) the question what are formal methods was easy to answer. However, code verification in Hoare style systems failed not only because of its inability to cope with complexity but also because this restricted approach did not meet important needs of software engineering. Meanwhile the situation has drastically changed. We are confronted with an enormous variety of formal approaches and tools. Among these are many that address the critical early stages of software development. Although much progress has been made with respect to fully automatic methods little attention has been paid to the integration of different specialised approaches and to the overall development process.
Formal techniques for requirements analysis often deal with a particular aspect of the system to be designed. Examples of such aspects are properties of information flow, correctness of (cryptographic) protocols, and real time behaviour. In this paper we concentrate on real time analysis as one view on a system among others. It is not difficult to imagine a system that separates different applications by controlling the flow of information between them using authentication protocols as one of the security mechanisms and that in addition has to satisfy certain real time requirements.
Although it is well known that many severe errors occur already in the early stages of the development process it is the case also for later design stages like architectural design and implementation that they have to be treated formally if one aims at high assurance levels. For example, according to level EAL5 of Common Criteria (CC) [7] , a formal high-level design and a "correspondence proof" with resect to the so-called functional specification has to be provided. In the case of real time systems one has to define how the intended global behaviour is realized by separating the control component from its environment and by making assumptions (delays, cycle time) explicit. This scenario is described in section 3. Therefore, a number of particular views for requirements analysis have to be linked to a single abstract systems specification (System Design Spec.) that serves as a starting point for the refinement process (see Figure 1) .
Rather than having a satisfies relation between a specification and a collection of simple properties that have to be established, requirements analysis will be based on its own descriptions (views) and postulated properties that refer to these descriptions. The description of a particular view will not necessarily use the same terminology as the system specification and often application specific formalisms and tools will allow for an efficient analysis. For establishing information flow properties a technique called non-interference, which is based on closure properties of sets of (system) traces, has to be used [8] . The analysis of protocols is based on a different kind of traces [10] that include steps of an attacker. A number of tools, like for example the one described in [9] , have been used in this area. The real time view can be implemented by Hybrid Automata [2] or by Timed Automata [3] . Again, tools like HyTech [4] provide efficient techniques to establish real-time properties.
In the following we present a general technique called observer models to link abstract descriptions of the real time behaviour of a system to a system specification consisting of a control component, an environment, and a clock by means of an observer mapping. After an outline of the general technique we shall illustrate our approach using the specification of a controller for a gasburner (together with an environment and a clock) and a Hybrid Automaton that describes the global realtime behaviour of the system.
Observer Models for Realtime Properties
Requirements of a system to be developed are specified and analysed by possibly several different formalisms that are specific for a particular view on that system. The choice of the formalisms can be influenced by several factors: preferences or expertise of the user, special features that need certain constructs of the specification language, system support, and the re-use of already existing specifications. In Figure 1 each view is represented by an Observer-Spec i following its own description technique and formalism. One of these specifications might contain a global description of the runs of a protocol while another view concentrates on realtime properties. In the following we shall assume that the realtime view is given by Hybrid Automata [2] .
As already mentioned above a view will also include properties, called OSProperties i in Figure 1 , that have to be established from the observer specification. Realtime requirements can be formulated and proven using tools like HyTech [4] . Note that we consider Hybrid Automata as a kind of comprehensive Obs.
Map. description of the entire system behaviour with respect to time constraints. As can be seen from our example, the description is global in the sense that it does not distinguish between the control system and its environment. States of the Hybrid Automaton therefore do not directly correspond to internal states of the controller. They rather describe certain situations that might occur in a run of the three components (controller, environment, clock) together. To demonstrate this we will start an example scenario in section 3 using the specification of a gasburner controller.
To integrate various views into a common formal development the Observer-Spec i and the OS-Properties i first have to be translated into the language of the System Design Spec. The resulting specifications are called OS-SD-Spec and OS-SD-Prop-Spec. The translation of Hybrid Automata into the specification language of VSE is described in [11, 12] . The language used in VSE [6, 5] is VSE-SL. This is similar to TLA but with some extensions concerning among others the handling of shared variables and the handling of assumption commitment specifications.
It can be shown that the satisfies relation between OS-SD-SPEC i and OS-SD-Prop-Spec i holds, if and only if the satisfies relation holds between Observer-Spec i and OS-Properties i . First of all this means that results obtained by using a tool like HyTech can be safely integrated into the overall development. However, since the language of OS-SD-Spec and OS-SD-Prop-Spec is more expressive (than that of Hybrid Automata) requirements specifications that are still "in the style of Hybrid Automata" but more general than these can be used in this context if one is inclined to use deductive techniques instead of model-checking. As an example one might wish to consider state transitions where one of the parameters (like speed) changes arbitrarily.
We are still left with the problem of establishing a link between the system specification and the particular realtime view we have defined. This is done by a mapping (called Obs. Map i in Figure 1 ) that (in the case of realtime requirements) interprets a given state of the interleaved computation of the controller, environment, and clock as a state of the (translation of the) Hybrid Automaton. It thereby turns the entire controller scenario into a model (in the sense of Hybrid Automata). For this we need to be sure that the translation faithfully preserves the semantics of Hybrid Automata.
In the following we present an instantiation of the general methodology that uses an abstract and global specification of the realtime behaviour of a gasburner scenario by a Hybrid Automaton on the one side and the specification of a controller that is connected to an environment by sensors and actors on the other. We outline the proof, that the automaton really describes the behaviour of the technical scenario with respect to a given mapping.
General Specification Scheme for Observer Models
The general scenario (see Figure 2 ), which we shall instantiate using a realistic yet abstract gasburner specification consists of three components: an environment, a controller and an observer/clock component. Which role do the individual components play now? Generally, given a system design one cannot decide always accurately, which parts are to be assigned to the environment and which parts belong to the controller itself. In the application of formal methods we are often interested in the safety critical parts of the system to be developed. The other parts are considered to be irrelevant for the safety of the system. These parts could consist for example of monitoring units 1 . The fact is substantial that the control, which is to be refined later or at least is applicable for a refinement, should contain all the safety critical parts.
The behaviour of the environment is determined by the specification of its interfaces. I.e. the environment has to supply the values needed on the various interfaces (in time). To guarantee the right functioning of the system in this case we have to make assumptions about the correct behaviour of the environment 2 . These assumptions can be used in the proof of the postulated properties of the system. If the environment component does not only exist as an interface definition, but also as a component with accurately specified behaviour, then one can prove these assumptions about the environment using the behaviour of the environment. Of course the type, range, and depth of the specification of both the environment and controller depends on the properties that should be fulfilled. The environment and the system/controller are specified as usual temporal logic specifications. Both components can be structured into subcomponents.
The specification of the observer/clock component differs in some sense from these usual specifications. One of the tasks of the observer is that it holds the time. But this fact does not influence the method described here.
The essential part of the observer is that it observes the system parts that are built from the Controller and the Environment components. These observations are filtered by the observer and communicated to the outside world. This filtration of the behaviour of the whole system constitutes a special view on the system that will be a realtime view in our example described in section 4. This is indicated by the right part of Figure 2 consisting of Observer-Spec 1 (instantiated by the Hybrid Automaton Gasburner) and the translation of this gasburner into a VSE specification (see OS-SD-SPEC 1 in Figure 2 ). The languages used in the real specification are VSE-SL (VSE-Specification Language) and Hybrid Automata as indicated in Figure 2 .
In what follows, the general scenario is replaced by the real scenario of the gasburner.
Gasburner as Realtime Observation
The real scenario is included in the general one in Figure 2 by giving the instantiations for the Observer, Environment, and Controller components (that are the TLSPECS Environment, Controller and Observer respectively) and by giving instantiations for the System Design Spec, OS-SD-SPEC 1 and Observer-Spec 1 from Figure 1 . A screenshot of the VSE development graph [5, 6] of the implementation of the real scenario is given in Figure 3 . In Figure 3 the composition of the environment, the controller and the observer is combined to the gasburner component representing the real gasburner.
Next we want to show that the VSE-observation (the VSE specification resulted from the translation of the hybrid gasburner into VSE [11] shown in Figure 3 as the temporal logic specification gasprop 3 is satisfied by the combined gasburner. That way the VSE-observation represents a complex realtime property of this gasburner.
The definitions of the datatypes are located in the theories def1, def2, def3, and Definition in In what follows we describe the scheduling of the three components and the specification of the components itself. 
Scheduling
The scheduling between the components of the gasburner, i.e. the environment, the controller, and the observer is realised with the help of the shared variable who. In the absence of such a scheduling variable, component steps are simply interleaved. Combining the components without scheduling would result in a situation where we did not know what component computes next. In particular we would not know when the observer makes its next observation. In order to define an observer component that is not too complicated and in order to guarantee that the observer makes an observation when significant changes happen we have introduced a scheduling where the computation of the components starts with the Observer followed by the Controller. After this first phase the computing order of the components is: Environment, Observer, Controller. Of course, there are other possibilities to schedule the components. One of these is to start with an initial sequence consisting of Observer, Controller and again the Observer and after that the repeated computation order is Environment, Observer, Controller, and Observer. It has revealed that this scheduling results in a more complicated behaviour description of the observer and in more complicated proofs. The implementation of the scheduling can be taken from the description of the various components shown in Figures 7, 4 and 5.
Environment
The specification of the environment is shown in Figure 5 . It consists of the definition of the possible initial states and the actions the environment can take 4 . Note that, because of the initialisation shown in Figure 5 , the VSE-observation's initial state is leaking.
The action the environment can take is described in the ACTIONS-slot by the action env act. The environment is specified such that the panel can change arbitrarily, but the leak sensor representing the sensor to measure whether unburned gas flows out has to work correct. This means that in a situation in which the panel is off or the gasflow is blocked the sensor is expected to deliver the right values. Specifying the environment this way results in the assumption that the environment is expected never to fail. Faulty sensors are excluded from the model 5 .
Controller
The TLSPEC of the controller is given in Figure 4 . Again, its initial state description forces the gasburner observation to start in the leaking state. The actions the controller can take are described in the ACTIONS slot by A1 through A7. The actions are disjunctively connected to a single action A1toA7. 
Fig. 4. Specification of the Controller
Since in every moment of execution only one of these actions is enabled, only this very action can be taken unless the controller stutters.
Up to now we have specified the controller together with its environment. By adding a clock component that mimics the flow of time (the change of the variable now) we end up in a system for which we can prove certain realtime properties.
As described in section 1 our methodology is different. It is not our aim to prove single realtime properties of a system, rather we want to check its entire realtime behaviour. How this is realised is explained in the next sections.
Observer
As can be recognised by looking at the specification of the controller and the environment, a simple refinement mapping [1] is not enough to prove the refine- One reason for that is that in a refinement mapping only those variables can be mapped that are known in the actual state. In this sense a refinement mapping is a filter that maps the states of the implementing system to the states of the implemented system. The refinement model described here uses the usual refinement mapping extended by an observer component. The observer component together with the refinement mapping represents an external observer filtering the observed behaviour and mapping these filtered behaviours to special observer behaviours represented in our case by the translated hybrid gasburner shown in section 4.5. As already mentioned in section 1 observations may look at the system from different angles. This could be a data flow perspective or, as in our example here, a realtime perspective. The responsibility of the observer is to map the states of the real gasburner to the (virtual) states of the translated hybrid gasburner. In the easiest case the mapping only consists of a variable mapping which simply renames or recomputes the values of the variables according to certain given functions. The mapping of the variable state of the translated hybrid gasburner is somewhat more complicated since there is no immediate correlation between variables of the implementing system and the variable state. Moreover, the mapping does not only depend on the actual state of the implementing system but also on some other information given by the behaviour of the observer. This situation is illustrated in Figure 6 . Some of the steps of the hybrid gasburner in Figure 6 relate to stuttering steps and some We now come to the actual specification of the observer (given in Figure  7) . In its specification it should be avoided to rebuild the specification of the hybrid gasburner shown in section 4.5. This can be accomplished by certain syntactical restrictions on the observer's actions. For instance only the variables of the controller and the environment are allowed in the enabling conditions.
The observer has to handle the following situations that might occur in the hybrid gasburner: The system is in its initial state and gas flows out of the nozzle without being burned, the system changes from leaking to non-leaking, the system remains leaking or it changes from non-leaking to leaking. To recognise these situations in the observer component it is not enough to only have a look at the values of the input variables in the actual state. Looking at these variables the observer could not recognise whether there was a situation change from leaking to non-leaking or not. In order to detect all these situation changes the observer stores parts of the previous observation in internal variables (gas int and leak sens int).
Let us have a more detailed look at one of the possible situations. Assume that the condition leak to non leak (see Figure 7) is satisfied. This means that the actual values of the variables gasflow and leak sens are blocked and F, respectively. Moreover, assume that the previous observations of the observer where that there was a running gas flow and a leak, i.e. gas int is run and leak sens int is T. This situation indicates that the system happened to be in a leaking situation and changed to a non-leaking situation. The observer reacts on this change by setting the state variable to non leak and by resetting the variable x to 0. This corresponds exactly to the behaviour of the hybrid system in such a situation. That way the behaviour of the hybrid gasburner is filtered out of the behaviour of the controller and the environment. 
The Gasburner as VSE Specification
As usual we illustrate hybrid automata as annotated graphs. The hybrid gasburner is then picturised as follows:
Non-Leak x := 0, y := 0,
The meaning of the variables of the hybrid gasburner is as follows. y accumulates overall time. x represents a control clock that guarantees that the system remains for at most 1 time unit within location Leak and for at least 30 time units within location Non-Leak. t counts leakage time, i.e. the amount of time the system resides within Leak.
The translation of the hybrid gasburner (see [11] ) then results in the VSE gasburner specification: This VSE gasburner specification constitutes the gasprop TLSPEC given in Figure 3 and represents a complex realtime property we want to prove from the gasburner.
Example Behaviour of the Real Gasburner
This section mainly consists of the table shown in Figure 8 that provides a possible initial part of the behaviour of the real gasburner (see the upper part of the table) including the mapping done by the observer component and the refinement mapping 6 . The table shows how the filter consisting of the observer component works and therefore how it maps the behaviour of the real gasburner to the hybrid gasburner (see the lower part of Table 8 ). The proof given in section 4.8 finally states that every behaviour of the real gasburner is mapped to a behaviour of the hybrid gasburner and so that the refinement relation is established. For readability we use the abbreviations n l for non leaking and bl Table 8 . If we just consider the lower part we can see that this is also a possible behaviour of the hybrid gasburner.
Handling of the Constant c
The constant c, as introduced in [11] , plays a special role in the example presented here. It is used to get an exact discretisation of the continuous behaviour of the original hybrid gasburner. Moreover, it is used in the specification of the Controller (see Figure 4 ) in the actions A5 and A6. The role of the natural constants c is the same as in the translation of hybrid automata into VSE [11] . It makes the system independent from the chosen time unit. Let us assume, for example, the value of c is 10. Then the clock has to make 300 steps, before the barrier is reached. If, however, c is 1000 the clock has to tick 30.000 times to reach the barrier. I.e. if we consider seconds as the basic time unit then steps take 1 10 of a second or a millisecond, respectively. However, the real proof of the (safety) properties is done independent from specific values of the constant c. Therefore it is valid for all possible integer values and thus for all granularities (even the infinitesimal).
Refinement Proof
In this chapter we shall sketch the refinement proof indicated in Figure 3 by a VSE satisfies-link. The proof is done locally to the observer component. During the proof one immediately realises that assumptions about the behaviour of the environment of the observer are needed. These assumptions deal with two different proof situations. First, we have to know whether we are in a leaking or a non-leaking state. We insert this knowledge by the following invariants into the proof. The formula intern(observer) represents the internal behaviour of the observer component, i.e. the behaviour of the observer without the hiding quantification.
✷(intern(observer)
In the second proof situation we need knowledge about the behaviour of the controller in the non leak leak situation. Again this knowledge is inserted by the following assumptions:
✷((leak sens = T ∧ leak sens int = F ∧ gasf low = run) → now ≥ timer + 30 * c) ✷((leak sens = T ∧ leak sens int = F ∧ gasf low = run) → x = now − timer It is evident that the proofs of these assumptions need knowledge about the controller component as well as about the scheduling. Finally, the proof is performed locally to the observer component and is exported as a lemma to the global proof obligation.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a methodology, observer models, for formal requirements engineering. Its applicability is illustrated with the help of a realistic gasburner example that is presented in detail.
One of the open issues in this context is the question how to refine a specification without doing the whole proof work again. This problem seems to be very similar to that of refinement in the security area, for example in protocol analysis.
